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he post-PC world is upon us. On Christmas Day, 2011, the number of tablet 
computer owners in the world doubled. Apple consumes more silicon than 
any company on earth, yet it controls only 12% of the PC market. Physical me-
dia for music and video are antiques and printed media is next. I have not printed a 
single technical paper since purchasing my iPad a month after they came out. I have 
not visited a physical library in over 10 years. 
We are consuming more infor-
mation in more ways than ever in our 
history. Information is ubiquitous and 
always available. The industrial revolu-
tion snatched up our information infra-
structure and made its products com-
modities. Specialized tools targeting 
specific types of information and con-
sumers are replacing general purpose 
desktop PCs at a rapid pace. Truly, the 
post-PC world has arrived. 
Yet… 
Accounting still needs physical re-
ceipts for my trips. They will scan them 
and destroy them, but they need physi-
cal receipts. Wouldn’t it be simpler for 
me to scan and send them myself? The 
“sign and return” two-step is still far too 
common - receive a document in email; 
print it; sign it; scan it; send it back; and 
throw the copy in the recycling bin. 
What if someone cuts a signature out of 
a previously signed document and 
“signs” the document without my 
knowledge? Contracts, POs, and the pa-
perwork of business is still quite literally 
paper. Wouldn’t it be simpler to never 
print them at all? Homework, projects, 
exams, and textbooks are still largely 
physical, linear, and expensive. Why is 
this? Whatever happened to the paper-
less office promised two decades ago? 
The technology is most clearly here and 
available. What’s missing? What does 
paperless mean? 
Paperless means literally less paper, 
lowering costs, and producing less 
waste. These are great things. However, 
there is another side to this coin that in-
stitutions are finally recognizing. What 
we are really doing is shifting, rather 
than eliminating consumption. Instead 
of reams of paper and stamps, we now 
consume terabytes of bandwidth and 
storage. Thus, we need more infor-
mation technology. We need greater 
bandwidth and storage, new kinds of 
data archives, more software with far 
higher complexity, all with increased 
reliability and ubiquity requirements. 
We may need more people, or we may 
need less people, only time will tell. 
However, we certainly need different 
people or the same people with different 
skills. New skills for everyone. New pro-
tocols for information exchange. New 
mechanisms for decision-making. New 
classes of people who fix our technology 
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and make sure it is up-to-date and al-
ways there. Still, this will do nothing for 
the print-and-sign protocol because 
while the paper carries information we 
see, it also establishes trust. We need new 
ways of establishing trust that reflect our 
new ways of storing and transmitting 
information. 
For a researcher who looks at high-
assurance systems and security, the need 
to shift trust from physical to virtual things 
is fascinating. When we make things 
electronic, we eliminate the traditional 
places where we root our trust – the 
physicality of receipt or a contract, the 
ink of a signature, the weight of a book, 
or the authenticity of a homework sub-
mission or exam. All of these things def-
initely convey information and there are 
more efficient, more effective ways of 
transferring and storing that infor-
mation. But trust is simply not keeping 
up – we need better models for estab-
lishing trust. 
Certainly there is risk in paperless 
trust. There is also risk in physical arti-
facts of trust – that risk is simply ob-
scured by familiarity. We have all heard 
“it’s always been done this way”, “I’ve 
never seen it done that way”, or my per-
sonal favorite “the University of (your 
favorite rival here) does it this way.” We 
all have Rasputin whispering in our ear 
about lawsuits, audits, FERPA, HIPAA, 
security and friends that surely enough 
paper will protect us from. But paper 
won’t protect us. We know it won’t be-
cause it never has. So, let’s move for-
ward. 
A signature, a sealed envelope, and 
handshake are all physical things where 
we root our trust. When a trusted party 
signs a letter, the contents of that letter 
are trusted to come from the associated 
agent. When a letter is sealed in an enve-
lope, the contents are trusted to be de-
livered in a confidential manner. Finally, 
when information comes from a trusted 
source through other trusted parties, the 
contents are trusted. 
The tools of virtual trust are crypto-
graphic functions for encrypting and 
signing messages and cryptographic 
protocols for exchanging information. 
Encrypting information with a key pro-
vides the same trust as a sealed envelope 
– no unauthorized agent may access 
transmitted information that is encrypt-
ed. Signing information with a key pro-
vides the same trust as a physical signa-
ture – no unauthorized agent may gen-
erate a signature over information. Pro-
tocols provide us methodologies for us-
ing encryption and signing to exchange 
information. 
Exchanging information securely 
using encryption and signing incorpo-
rated into protocols will emerge as a vi-
able solution for trust management. 
They key is asymmetric key encryption. 
In asymmetric key encryption one key is 
used for encrypting secrets while anoth-
er is used to decrypt. If Alice and Bob 
want to communicate securely, they ex-
change their public keys and keep their 
private keys secret. If Alice wants to 
send Bob a confidential file, she simply 
encrypts it with is public key. Upon re-
ceipt, Bob can decrypt it with his private 
key. If Cindy intercepts Alice’s message, 
without Bob’s private key she cannot 
decrypt it. This guarantees confidentiality 
in communication. 
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Conversely, if Bob wants Alice to 
know it is he sending the file, he can cre-
ate a cryptographic signature for the file. 
Bob creates a signature from his file us-
ing a hash function. That signature is 
then encrypted with Bob’s private key. 
When Alice receives the file that Bob 
sent, she can decrypt the signature with 
his public key and check the fingerprint 
against the file she received. If Cindy 
sent the file posing as Bob, Bob’s public 
key cannot decrypt the signature be-
cause Cindy’s key created it. Thus, Alice 
would know that Bob did not send the 
file. This guarantees integrity in commu-
nication. 
Asymmetric key cryptography gives 
us the tools to electronically replace en-
velops that guarantee confidentiality 
and physical signatures that guarantee 
integrity. Protocols then specify how 
those tools are used in practice. One 
such protocol example is S/MIME for 
sending privacy-enhanced email. 
S/MIME is incorporated in virtually eve-
ry modern email client. It manages keys, 
ensures your messages are encrypted 
and signed, and decrypts and checks 
signatures on incoming email. It literally 
eliminates the sign and return protocol 
discussed earlier. There are far more so-
phisticated protocols for achieving a 
wide variety of security and privacy 
goals. We are seeing these protocols im-
plemented in everything from software 
distribution systems to lab information 
maintenance. 
Establishing trust electronically has 
its problems. Key management – partic-
ularly revocation of compromised keys – 
is an ongoing area of research and de-
velopment. But the tools are there for us 
to use. The time is now for us to move 
forward and begin to put trust on equal 
footing with information in the electron-
ic world. 
  
